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**Explanation of the Presentation of  
Objects and Object-Possessors  
as well as  
Awarenesses and Knowers**

by  
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## Introduction

I bow down to the Lama and the protector Manjughosha.

This is an explanation of the presentation of objects and object-possessors as well as awarenences and knowers [from within] “The Greater Path of Reasoning” [section] of The Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning, Presentation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Treatises on Valid Cognition<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>Editor’s note: All instances of the word “prime” (Tib. *tshad ma*) that occur in E. Napper’s translation have been changed to “valid.”

## Part One: Objects

In our own system, concerning the first from among the two, objects and object-possessors, the definition of an **object** is:

that which is known by an awareness.

When objects are divided there are:

- (1) appearing objects,
- (2) determined objects, and
- (3) objects of engagement.

The appearing object of a particular awareness and apprehended object of that awareness are synonymous.

Whatever is an established base is necessarily an appearing object. This is because whatever is a thing is necessarily the appearing object of a direct perceiver, and whatever is permanent is necessarily the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness.

The first reason is established because appearing object of a direct perceiver, apprehended object [of a direct perceiver], and thing are synonymous. Furthermore, it follows that whatever is a thing must be the appearing object of a direct perceiver because whatever is a thing must be that which is realized in a manifest manner by a direct perceiver.

The second basic reason [i.e. whatever is permanent is necessarily the appearing object of a conceptual consciousness] is established because appearing object of a conceptual consciousness, apprehended object [of a conceptual consciousness], and permanent phenomenon are synonymous.

Also object of engagement of a direct perceiver, and object of the mode of apprehension of a direct perceiver are synonymous. Determined object of thought, object of engagement [of thought], and object of the mode of apprehension of thought are synonymous.

Whatever is an established base is necessarily the object of the mode of apprehension of both a conceptual and a non-conceptual consciousness.

Whatever is the object of the mode of apprehension of the thought consciousness apprehending it is not necessarily an object of the mode of apprehension of thought.

This is because the horns of a rabbit are not an object of the mode of apprehension of thought.

This follows because [the horns of a rabbit] are not an object of thought.

This is because [the horns of a rabbit] are not an object of an awareness, which is because [the horns of a rabbit] are not that which is suitable to be an object of an awareness.

It follows that the subject [the horns of a rabbit] is the object of the mode of apprehension of a thought consciousness apprehending it because of being selfless.



## Part Two: Object-Possessors

With respect to the second, object-possessors, there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions

### *Definition*

First, the definition of something's being an **object-possessor** is:

a thing that possesses its respective object.

### *Divisions*

Second, when object-possessors are divided, there are three:

- (1) persons,
- (2) awarenesses, and
- (3) expressive sounds.

### **I. PERSON**

With regard to persons, the definition of something's being a **person** is:

a being imputed in dependence upon any of its five aggregates.

Self, I, person, and being are synonymous.

An illustration is a being who possesses a basis of one of the three realms.

### **II. AWARENESS**

With regard to the second, awarenesses, there are two parts: (1) definitions and (2) divisions

### *Definitions*

First, the definition of an **awareness** is:

a knower.

The definition of a **consciousness** is:

that which is clear and knowing.

Awareness (*blo*), knower (*rig pa*), and consciousness (*shes pa*) are synonymous.

### *Divisions*

Second, when awarenesses are divided, there are two:

- (1) valid cognizers
- (2) non-valid awarenesses

#### **1. Valid cognizers**

In our own system, the definition of a **valid cognizer** is:

a new incontrovertible knower.

There is a necessity for expressing the three – “new”, “incontrovertible”, and “knower” – as parts of the definition of valid cognizer, because “new” eliminates that subsequent cognizers are valid cognizers,

“incontrovertible” eliminates that correctly assuming consciousnesses are valid cognizers, and “knower” eliminates that physical sense powers are valid cognizers.

When valid cognizers are divided there are two:

- (1) direct valid cognizers and
- (2) inferential valid cognizers.

The individual definitions, illustrations, and so forth will be explained later.

### **(A) DIRECT PERCEIVERS**

The definition of **an awareness that is a direct perceiver** is:  
a knower that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

When awarenesses that are direct perceivers are divided there are four:

- (1) Sense direct perceiver,
- (2) Mental direct perceiver,
- (3) Self-knowing direct perceiver, and
- (4) Yogic direct perceivers.

#### **(1) Sense direct perceivers**

With respect to the first of these [sense direct perceivers] there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

#### ***Definition***

First, the definition of **a sense direct perceiver** is:

- that which is produced in dependence on its own uncommon empowering condition, a physical sense power, and
- is a knower that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

#### ***Divisions***

Second, when [sense direct perceivers] are divided there are three:

- (1) valid cognizers that are sense direct perceivers,
- (2) subsequent cognizers that are sense direct perceivers, and
- (3) awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained that are sense direct perceivers.

The first is, for example, the first moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form.

The second is, for example, the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form.

The third is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form in the continuum of a person whose mind is especially attracted to a pleasant sound.

When sense direct perceivers are divided in another way, there are five:

- (1) sense direct perceivers apprehending forms,

- (2) sense direct perceivers apprehending sounds,
- (3) sense direct perceivers apprehending odors,
- (4) sense direct perceivers apprehending tastes, and
- (5) sense direct perceivers apprehending tangible objects.

The definition of a **sense direct perceiver apprehending a form** is:

- that which is generated in dependence on its own uncommon empowering condition, the eye sense power, and its observed object condition, a form, and
- is a knower that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

Extend this format to the other [sense direct perceivers].

Thus, [the definition of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a sound], etc. is: (1) that which is generated in dependence on its own uncommon empowering condition, the ear sense power, and its observed object condition, a sound, [and (2) is a knower that is free from conceptuality and nonmistaken].

### (2) Mental direct perceivers

With respect to the second, mental direct perceivers, there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

#### *Definition*

First, the definition of a **mental direct perceiver** is:

- that which is generated in dependence on a mental sense power that is its own uncommon empowering condition and
- is a consciousness that is an other knower that is free from conceptuality and nonmistaken.

#### *Divisions*

Second, when mental direct perceivers are divided there are three:

- (1) valid cognizers that are mental direct perceivers,
- (2) subsequent cognizers that are mental direct perceivers, and
- (3) awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained that are mental direct perceivers.

The first, [a valid cognizer that is a mental direct perceiver] is, for example, the first moment of a clairvoyance that knows another's mind.

The second [a subsequent cognizer that is a mental direct perceiver] is, for example, the second moment of a clairvoyance that knows another's mind.

The third [an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained that is a mental direct perceiver] is, for example, a mental direct perceiver apprehending a sound in the continuum of a person whose mind is especially attracted to a beautiful form.

### (3) Self-knowing direct perceivers

With respect to the third, self-knowing direct perceivers, there are two: (1) definitions and (2) divisions.

### ***Definitions***

First, the definition of a **self-knower** is:

that which has the aspect of an apprehender.

The definition of a **self-knowing direct perceiver** is:

that which has the aspect of an apprehender, is free from conceptuality, and is nonmistaken.

### ***Divisions***

Second, when [self-knowing direct perceivers] are divided there are three:

- (1) valid cognizers that are self-knowing direct perceivers,
- (2) subsequent cognizers that are self-knowing direct perceivers, and
- (3) awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained that are self-knowing direct perceivers.

The first [a self-knowing direct valid cognizer] is, for example, the first moment of a self-knowing direct perceiver that experiences an eye consciousness.

The second [a self-knowing direct subsequent cognizer] is, for example, the second moment of a self-knowing direct perceiver that experiences an eye consciousness.

Examples of the third [an awareness to which an object appears but is not ascertained that is a self-knowing direct perceiver] are:

- a self-knowing direct perceiver in the continuum of a Samkhya that experiences bliss as being a consciousness,
- a self-knowing direct perceiver in the continuum of a Vaisheshika that experiences bliss as being a consciousness, and
- a self-knower in the continuum of a Nihilist that experiences an inferential cognizer as being a valid cognizer.

### **(4) Yogic direct perceivers**

With respect to the fourth, yogic direct perceivers, there are two: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

### ***Definition***

First, the definition of a **yogic direct perceiver** is:

- that which is generated in dependence on its own uncommon empowering condition, a meditative stabilization that is a union of calm abiding and special insight, and
- is an other-knowing exalted knower in the continuum of a Superior that is free from conceptuality and non-mistaken.

## ***Divisions***

When [yogic direct perceivers] are divided there are two:

- (1) valid cognizers that are yogic direct perceivers and
- (2) subsequent cognizers that are yogic direct perceivers.

There are no awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained that are yogic direct perceivers because whatever is a yogic direct perceiver necessarily ascertains its object of comprehension. This is because Dharmakirti's *Commentary on (Dignaga's) "Compendium on Valid Cognition"* says, "From just seeing, the great intelligent ones ascertain all aspects."

Although subsequent cognizers that are yogic direct perceivers exist, the second moment and so forth of an omniscient exalted wisdom are not subsequent cognizers because whatever is an omniscient exalted wisdom is necessarily a valid cognizer. This is so because Gyel-tsap's *Explanation of (Dharmakirti's) "Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium on Valid Cognition'"*: *Unmistaken Illumination of the Path to Liberation* says, "No matter how much I turn inside and think about it, I do not feel that an omniscient exalted wisdom is not pervaded by being a new realizer" [in other words, an omniscient exalted wisdom is necessarily a new realizer].

Also Kay-drup Rin-bo-chay's *Clearing Away Darkness of Mind with Respect to the Treatises on Valid cognition* says, "If [something] became a subsequent cognizer merely through [its object's] being apprehended by a former valid cognizer, it would follow that the second and subsequent moments of an omniscient exalted wisdom would be subsequent cognizers. There exist many such flaws as will be indicated below."

### **(B) DIRECT VALID COGNIZERS**

The definition of a **direct valid cognizer** is:

new incontrovertible knower that is free of conceptuality.

When direct valid cognizers are divided there are four:

- (1) self-knowing direct valid cognizers,
- (2) sense direct valid cognizers,
- (3) mental direct valid cognizers, and
- (4) yogic direct valid cognizers.

#### **(1) Self-knowing direct valid cognizers**

From among these, the definition of the first [**a self-knowing direct valid cognizer**] is:

a new incontrovertible knower, free from conceptuality, that is directed only inward and is just an apprehender.

#### **(2) Sense direct valid cognizers**

The definition of the second [**a sense direct valid cognizer**] is:

a new incontrovertible knower, free from conceptuality, that arises in dependence upon a physical sense power that is its uncommon empowering condition.

When [sense direct valid cognizers] are divided, there are five:

(1-5) sense direct valid cognizers apprehending forms and so forth.

### **(3) Mental direct valid cognizers**

The definition of the third [**a mental direct valid cognizer**] is:

a new incontrovertible knower, free from conceptuality, that arises in dependence upon a mental sense power that is its uncommon empowering condition.

When [mental direct valid cognizers] are divided, there are six:

(1-6) mental direct valid cognizers apprehending forms and so forth.

### **(4) Yogic direct valid cognizers**

The definition of the fourth [**a yogic direct valid cognizer**] is:

another-knowing exalted knower in the continuum of a Superior that, in dependence upon a meditative stabilization that is a union of calm abiding and special insight and is its [uncommon] empowering condition, newly and directly realizes either subtle impermanence or the coarse or subtle selflessness of persons.

When [yogic direct valid cognizers] are divided there are three:

- (1) valid cognizers directly realizing subtle impermanence,
- (2) valid cognizers directly realizing the coarse selflessness of persons, and
- (3) valid cognizers directly realizing the subtle selflessness of persons.

## **(C) FACSIMILES OF A DIRECT PERCEIVER**

The explanation of facsimiles of a direct perceiver has two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

### ***Definition***

First, the definition of a **facsimile of a direct perceiver** is:

a knower that is mistaken with regard to its appearing object.

[Facsimile of a direct perceiver] and mistaken consciousness are synonyms.

### ***Divisions***

Second, when [facsimiles of a direct perceiver] are divided, there are seven because there are:

- (1-6) six conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver and
- (7) one non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver.

### **(1-6) Conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver**

The first six [conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver] exist because there are:

- (1) mistaken conceptions,
- (2) conventional conceptions,
- (3) inferential conceptions,
- (4) conceptions arisen from inference,
- (5) memory conceptions, and
- (6) wishing conceptions.

Illustrations are, respectively,

- of the first, [a mistaken conception], a thought apprehending sound as permanent;
- of the second, [a conventional conception], an inferential cognizer that realizes sound to be impermanent;
- of the third, [an inferential conception], a thought that is a mind apprehending a sign;
- of the fourth, [a conception arisen from inference], a thought that arises after an inferential cognizer;
- of the fifth, [a memory conception], a thought that today remembers an object of the past, and, of the sixth, [a wishing conception], a thought that today wishes for an object of the future.

### (7) Non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver

There are many non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver.

From among the two, [non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver]

- (1) that are mental consciousnesses and
- (2) that are sense consciousnesses,

an illustration of the first was explained above.

With regard to the second, [non-conceptual facsimiles of a direct perceiver that are senseconsciousnesses], there are four:

- (1) the cause of error existing in the basis,
- (2) the cause of error existing in the abode,
- (3) the cause of error existing in the object, and
- (4) the cause of error existing in the immediately preceding condition.

The first, [the cause of error existing in the **basis**], is, for example, *an eye impaired by obscuring disease*, for a sense consciousness that sees one moon as two is produced in dependence upon that.

The second, [the cause of error existing in the **abode**], is, for example, *sitting in a boat*, for a senseconsciousness that sees trees as moving is produced in dependence upon that.

The third, [the cause of error existing in the **object**], is, for example, *a quickly whirling firebrand*, for a sense consciousness that sees a firebrand as a wheel is produced in dependence upon that.

The fourth, [the cause of error existing in the **immediately preceding condition**], is, for example, *amind disturbed by hatred*, for a sense consciousness that sees the earth as red is produced independence upon that.

Non-conceptual wrong consciousness, non-conceptual facsimile of a direct perceiver, and consciousness that has a clear appearance of a non-existent are synonymous.

#### **(D) INFERENCEAL VALID COGNIZERS**

The definition of an **inferential valid cognizer** is:

a new incontrovertible determinative knower that is directly produced in dependence on a correct sign that is its basis.

When [inferential valid cognizers] are divided, there are three:

- (1) inferential cognizers by the power of the fact,
- (2) inferential cognizers through renown, and
- (3) inferential cognizers through beliefs.

An illustration of the first, [an inferential cognizer by the power of the fact], is an inferential cognizer that realizes that sound is impermanent through the sign of being a product.

An illustration of the second, [an inferential cognizer through renown], is an inferential cognizer that realizes that it is suitable to express the rabbit-possessor by the term moon from the sign of its existing among objects of thought.

An illustration of the third [an inferential cognizer through belief], is an inferential cognizer that realizes that the scripture, “From giving, resources, from ethics, a happy [migration],” is incontrovertible with respect to the meaning indicated by it by the sign of its being a scripture free from the three contradictions.

An inferential cognizer through renown is necessarily an inferential cognizer by the power of the fact. Also whatever is a direct perceiver is not necessarily a direct valid cognizer because the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form is not a valid cognizer. That follows because that [i.e. the second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending a form] and the second moment of an inferential cognizer that realizes that sound is impermanent are subsequent cognizers. This is because Dharmottara’s *The Correct* says, “The two, the first moment of a direct perceiver and the first moment of inferential cognizer, are valid cognizers, but subsequent moments in the continuums of those because of being non-different in establishment and abiding, have forsaken being valid cognizers.”

#### **(E) TERMINOLOGICAL DIVISIONS OF VALID COGNIZERS**



### **(1) Inference for oneself and for another**

Furthermore, when [valid cognizers] are terminologically divided there are two:

- (1) inference for oneself and
- (2) inference for another.

The first [inference for oneself] and inferential cognizer are synonyms.

The second [inference for another] and correct proof statement are synonyms.

### **(2) Ancillary, minds apprehending a sign**

Ancillary, with respect to explaining minds apprehending a sign, there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

#### ***Definition***

The definition of something's being a **mind apprehending a sign in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product** is:

it is a knower – in the continuum of a full-fledged other party for whom sound is being proved to be impermanent by the sign product – that is a common locus of:

- being incontrovertible with respect to either that sound is a product or that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent and also
- being the cause of an inferential cognizer realizing that sound is impermanent by the sign product and arises in dependence upon its acting as a causal condition.

#### ***Divisions***

When [minds apprehending a sign] are divided, there are two:

- (1) minds apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product –that comprehend that sound is a product, and
- (2) minds apprehending a sign [in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product] thatcomprehend that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent.

(1) The definition of the first [something's being a **mind apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehends that sound is a product**] is:

it is a knower – in the continuum of a full-fledged other party for whom sound is being proved to be impermanent by the sign product – that is a common locus of:

- being incontrovertible with respect to sound as a product and also
- being the cause of an inferential cognizer that realizes that sound is impermanent by the sign product and arises in dependence upon its acting as a causal condition.

(2) The definition of the second [something's being a **mind apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehends that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent**] is:

it is a knower – in the continuum of a full-fledged other party for whom sound is being proved to be impermanent by the sign product – that is a common locus of:

- being incontrovertible with respect to whatever is a product necessarily being impermanent and also
- being the cause of an inferential cognizer that realizes sound as impermanent by the sign product and arises in dependence upon its acting as a causal condition.

(1) When the first [minds apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the signproduct – that comprehend that sound is a product] are divided, there are three:

- (a) direct perceivers that are minds apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehend that sound is a product,
- (b) inferential cognizers that are minds apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehend that sound is a product, and
- (c) subsequent cognizers that are minds apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehend that sound is a product.

(a) From among these, an illustration of the first [a direct perceiver that is a mind apprehending assign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehends that sound is a product] is a direct perceiver comprehending that sound is a product in the continuum of a full fledged other party for whom it is being proved that sound is impermanent by the sign product.

(b) An illustration of the second [an inferential cognizer that is a mind apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehends that sound is a product] is an inferential cognizer comprehending that sound is a product in the continuum of [such a person

(c) An illustration of the third [a subsequent cognizer that is a mind apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehends that sound is a product] is the second moment, and so forth, of an inferential cognizer comprehending that sound is a product, in the continuum of [such a person].

(2) Also, with respect to the second [minds apprehending a sign – in the proof of sound as impermanent by the sign product – that comprehend that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent], there are three:

- (a) direct perceivers that are minds apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehend that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent,

- (b) inferential cognizers that are minds apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehend that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, and
  - (c) subsequent cognizers that are minds apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehend that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent.
- (a) From among these, an illustration of the first [a direct perceiver that is a mind apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehends that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent] is a direct perceiver comprehending that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent in the continuum of a full-fledged other party for whom it is being proved that sound is impermanent by the sign product.
  - (b) An illustration of the second [an inferential cognizer that is a mind apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehends that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent] is an inferential cognizer comprehending that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, in the continuum of [such a person].
  - (c) An illustration of the third [a subsequent cognizer that is a mind apprehending a sign – in the proof that sound is impermanent by the sign product – that comprehends that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent] is the second moment, and so forth, of an inferential cognizer comprehending that whatever is a product is necessarily impermanent, in the continuum of [such a person].

**(F) VALID COGNIZERS THAT INDUCE ASCERTAINMENT BY THEMSELVES AND VALID COGNIZERS WHEN ASCERTAINMENT IS INDUCED BY ANOTHER**

When valid cognizers are divided [in another way], there are two:

- (1) valid cognizers that induce ascertainment by themselves and
- (2) valid cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another.

With respect to each of those, there are two parts: (1) definitions and (2) divisions.

Our own system is as follows. Gen-dun-drup’s *Ornament for Knowledge, the General Meaning [of Dharmakirti’s Commentary on (Dignaga’s) “Compendium on Valid cognition”]* posits thus:

***Definitions***

The definition of a **valid cognizer that induces ascertainment by itself** is:

- it is a valid cognizer;
- it is able to induce ascertainment through its own power with respect to its own nonarising if the nature of its object of comprehension did not abide with the object.

The definition of a **valid cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another** is:

- it is a valid cognizer;
- ascertainment must be induced through the power of another [valid cognizer] with respect to its own non-arising if the nature of its object of comprehension did not abide with the object.

It is correct to posit these in this way.

### ***Division***

- (1) In our own system, when valid cognizers that induce ascertainment by themselves are divided, there are five:
- (1) sense direct valid cognizers to which the ability to perform a function appears,
  - (2) sense direct valid cognizers that have a familiar object,
  - (3) self-knowing direct valid cognizers,
  - (4) yogic direct valid cognizers, and
  - (5) inferential valid cognizers.

Whatever is one of those five is necessarily a valid cognizer that induces ascertainment by itself.

Illustrations are as follows:

- the first, [a sense direct valid cognizer to which the ability to perform a function appears,] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver that apprehends fire as able to perform the functions of cooking and burning;
- the second, [a sense direct valid cognizer having a familiar object,] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of a son apprehending his father's form;
- the third, [a self-knowing direct valid cognizer,] is, for example, a self-knowing direct perceiver that experiences an eye consciousness;
- the fourth, [a yogic direct valid cognizer,] is, for example, an omniscient consciousness that is an other-knowing mental consciousness;
- the fifth, [an inferential valid cognizer,] is, for example, an inferential consciousness that realizes sound to be impermanent.

(2) When valid cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another are divided terminologically there are three:

- (1) initial direct perceivers,
- (2) inattentive direct perceivers, and
- (3) direct perceivers having a cause of error.

Illustrations are as follows:

- the first, [an initial direct perceiver,] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of a person who has not previously experienced seeing an utpala that apprehends the color of an utpala.
- the second, [an inattentive direct perceiver,] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver that apprehends a sound in the continuum of a person whose mind is especially attracted to a beautiful form;
- the third, [a direct perceiver having a cause of error,] is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending the color of a mirage that directly generates a superimposition apprehending the mirage as water.

When [valid cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another] are terminologically divided [in another way], there are three:

- (1) valid cognizers when ascertainment of the appearance is induced by itself but of the truth by another,
- (2) valid cognizers when ascertainment of the generality is induced by itself but of the particular by another, and
- (3) valid cognizers when ascertainment of even the mere appearance is induced by another.

The first is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending in the distance a reddish color which is in fact the color of fire and with respect to which there is doubt, wondering, “Is that the color of fire or not?”

The second is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending a tree having leaves and branches which is in fact an Ashoka tree and with respect to which there is doubt, wondering, “Is that an Ashoka tree or not?”

The third is, for example, a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue that induces a doubting consciousness that thinks, “Did I see blue or not?”

There is a difference between those [valid cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another] as to whether they are actual or imputed, for the first and second are actual [valid cognizers when ascertainment is induced by another] whereas the latter one [a valid cognizer when ascertainment of even the mere appearance is induced by another] is an imputed one.

Also, from amongst those, the first [a valid cognizer when ascertainment of the appearance is induced by itself but of the truth by another] is both that which induces ascertainment by itself and also a valid cognizer that induces ascertainment by itself with respect to a reddish color in the distance which is in fact the color of fire but with respect to which there is doubt, wondering, “Is that the color of fire or not?”

It is also both that when ascertainment is induced by another and a valid cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another with respect to such a reddish color being the color of fire.

However, it is not a valid cognizer with respect to that [reddish color being the color of fire].

In brief, whatever is a valid cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another is necessarily a valid cognizer.

However, whatever is a valid cognizer when ascertainment is induced by another with respect to a particular phenomenon is necessarily not a valid cognizer with respect to that phenomenon.

This is because whatever is a valid cognizer with respect to a particular phenomenon is necessarily a valid cognizer that induces ascertainment by itself with respect to that phenomenon.

### **(G) VALID COGNIZERS THAT ARE PERSONS, SPEECH, AND CONSCIOUSNESSES**

When valid cognizers are terminologically divided [in another way] there are three:

- (1) valid cognizers that are persons,
- (2) valid cognizers that are speech, and
- (3) valid cognizers that are consciousnesses.

The first [a valid cognizer that is a person] is, for example, the teacher Buddha.

The second [a valid cognizer that is speech] is, for example, the wheel of doctrine of the four noble truths.

The third [a valid cognizer that is a consciousness] is, for example, a direct perceiver or an inferential cognizer.

### **(H) DEFINITE ENUMERATION OF VALID COGNIZERS**

With respect to the enumeration being definite, valid cognizers are divided into two:

- (1) direct valid cognizers and
- (2) inferential valid cognizers.

That more than these are unnecessary and fewer would not be inclusive is the meaning of the enumeration of valid cognizers being limited to two for valid cognizers are limited to those two.

With respect to differences in substantial entity, direct perceiver and inferential cognizer are one substantial entity because direct perceiver is one substantial entity with inferential cognizer.

In dependence on this reasoning, [all of the following] are established as one substantial entity:

- the two, conceptual consciousness and non-conceptual consciousness;
- the two, mistaken consciousness and non-mistaken consciousness;
- the two, sense consciousness and mental consciousness;
- the two, mind and mental factor; and
- the two, valid cognizer and non-valid cognizer.

Therefore, the definition of **free from conceptuality** is:

free from being a determinative knower that apprehends a sound [generality] and a meaning [generality] as suitable to be mixed.

## **2. Non-valid consciousnesses**

With respect to the second, the explanation of non-valid consciousnesses, there are two parts:

(1) definition and (2) divisions.

### ***Definition***

In our own system the definition of a **non-valid consciousness** is:

a knower that is not newly incontrovertible.

### ***Divisions***

Secondly, when non-valid consciousnesses are divided, there are five:

- (1) subsequent cognizers,
- (2) correctly assuming consciousnesses,
- (3) awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained,
- (4) doubting consciousnesses, and
- (5) wrong consciousnesses.

### **(A) SUBSEQUENT COGNIZERS**

With respect to the first, the definition of a **subsequent cognizer** is:

a knower that realizes what has already been realized.

When subsequent cognizers are divided, there are three:

- (1) directly perceiving subsequent cognizers,
- (2) conceptual subsequent cognizers, and
- (3) subsequent cognizers that are neither of those two.

### **(1) Directly perceiving subsequent cognizers**

With respect to the first, [directly perceiving subsequent cognizers,] there are five:

- (1) directly perceiving subsequent cognizers that are sense direct perceivers,
- (2) directly perceiving subsequent cognizers that are mental direct perceivers,
- (3) directly perceiving subsequent cognizers that are self-knowing direct perceivers,
- (4) directly perceiving subsequent cognizers that are yogic direct perceivers, and
- (5) directly perceiving subsequent cognizers that are none of those four.

Illustrations are as follows:

- the first, for example, is that second moment of a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue;

- the second is, for example, the second moment of a clairvoyance knowing another’s mind;
- the third is, for example, the second moment of a self-knowing direct perceiver experiencing an eye consciousness, and so forth;
- the fourth is, for example, the second moment of an uninterrupted path of a path of seeing;
- and the fifth is, for example, the second moment of a direct perceiver.

**(1) Conceptual subsequent cognizers**

When the second, conceptual subsequent cognizers, are divided there are two:

- (1) conceptual subsequent cognizers that are induced by direct perceivers and
- (2) conceptual subsequent cognizers that are induced by inferential cognizers.

The first is, for example, a factually concordant ascertaining consciousness ascertaining blue that is induced by a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue.

The second is, for example, the second moment of an inferential cognizer realizing sound to be impermanent.

**(B) CORRECTLY ASSUMING CONSCIOUSNESSES**

With regard to the second [of the non-valid consciousnesses], correctly assuming consciousnesses, there are [two parts]: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

***Definition***

First, the definition of a **correctly assuming consciousness** is:

a factually concordant determinative knower that is controvertible with regard to determining its object.

***Divisions***

When [correctly assuming consciousnesses] are divided there are five:

- (1) correctly assuming consciousnesses that do not have a reason,
- (2) correctly assuming consciousnesses that have a contradictory reason,
- (3) correctly assuming consciousnesses for which the reason is indefinite [or lacks pervasion],
- (4) correctly assuming consciousnesses for which the reason is not established, and
- (5) correctly assuming consciousnesses for which a reason exists but is not settled.

The first [a correctly assuming consciousness that does not have a reason] is, for example, an awareness that apprehends sound to be impermanent in dependence upon the mere words, “Sound is impermanent.”

[This is a suitable example] because the words, “Sound is impermanent,” express a thesis that sound is impermanent, but not a reason.



The second [a correctly assuming consciousness having a contradictory reason] is, for example, an awareness that apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being empty of being able to perform a function.

[This is a suitable example] because empty of being able to perform a function is contradictory with impermanence.

The third [a correctly assuming consciousness for which the reason is not ascertained] is, for example, an awareness that apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being an object of comprehension.

[This is a suitable example] because object of comprehension is a reason that is indefinite in the proof of that [i.e., whatever is an object of comprehension is not necessarily impermanent].

The fourth [a correctly assuming consciousness for which the reason is not established] is, for example, an awareness that apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being an object of apprehension by an eye consciousness.

[This is a suitable example] because object of apprehension by an eye consciousness is a reason that is not established in the proof of that.

The fifth [a correctly assuming consciousness for which the reason exists but is not settled] is, for example, an awareness that apprehends sound to be impermanent from the sign of being a product, without its having been ascertained by valid cognition that sound is a product and whatever is a product must be impermanent.

[This is a suitable example] because although product is a correct sign in the proof of sound as impermanent, that person has not settled it.

### **(C) AWARENESSES TO WHICH THE OBJECT APPEARS WITHOUT BEING ASCERTAINED**

With respect to the third [of the five types of non-valid consciousnesses, awarenesses to which the object appears without being ascertained], the definition of something's being an **awareness to which an object appears without being ascertained** is:

a knower that is a common locus of:

- having clear appearance of the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of operation and
- being unable to induce ascertainment with respect to the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object of operation.

However, one should know the manner in which not to posit as the definition of "something's being an awareness to which the object appears without being ascertained," "that which is a common locus of (1) having clear appearance of the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object and (2) being unable to induce ascertainment with respect to the specifically characterized phenomenon that is its object."

This is because a sense consciousness that sees snow mountains as blue sees as blue the white color of the snow mountains, which is its object of operation, and therefore does not see clearly the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object of operation.

Still, since its appearing object, the white color of snow mountains, appears clearly as blue whereas it does not exist [as blue], there is clear appearance of the specifically characterized phenomenon which is its object.

Also it is unable to induce ascertainment with respect to that because it engages that [object] perversely.

Illustrations of awarenesses to which an object appears without being ascertained are, for example:

- a sense direct perceiver apprehending blue that induces the doubt that wonders, “Did I see blue or not?”;
- mental direct perceivers in the continua of ordinary beings apprehending the five objects – forms, and so forth; and
- self-knowers experiencing those [mental direct perceivers].

#### **(D) DOUBTING CONSCIOUSNESSES**

Our own system is that the definition of a **doubting consciousness** is:

a knower that has qualms two-pointedly by its own power.

A mind that possesses similarity with doubt and the feelings, etc., which are accompaniers of that [mind possessing similarity with doubt] have qualms by the power of doubt, but do not have qualms two-pointedly by their own power.

When doubting consciousnesses are divided there are three:

- (1) doubt tending toward the factual,
- (2) doubt tending toward the non-factual, and
- (3) equal doubt.

The first is, for example, doubt that thinks that sound is probably impermanent.

The second is, for example, doubt that thinks that sound is probably permanent.

The third is, for example, doubt that wonders whether sound is permanent or impermanent.

#### **(E) WRONG CONSCIOUSNESSES**

With regard to the fifth [of the five non-valid consciousnesses], wrong consciousnesses, there are the two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

#### ***Definition***

Our own system is that the definition of a **wrong consciousness** is:  
a knower that engages its object erroneously.

### ***Divisions***

Second, when wrong consciousnesses are divided, there are two:

- (1) conceptual wrong consciousnesses and
- (2) non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses.

Examples of the first are a thought apprehending sound as permanent and a thought apprehending the horns of a rabbit.

With regard to the second, [non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses], there are two:

- (1) mental consciousnesses [that are non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses] and
- (2) sense consciousnesses [that are non-conceptual wrong consciousnesses].

The first, [a mental non-conceptual wrong consciousness] is, for example, a dream consciousness that clearly sees as blue the blue of a dream.

This subject is a mental consciousness, a non-conceptual consciousness, and a wrong consciousness. Respectively,

- [it is a mental consciousness] because of being a dream consciousness;
- [it is a non-conceptual consciousness] because of being a consciousness that is free from being a determinative knower which apprehends a sound generality and a meaning generality as suitable to be mixed; and
- [it is a wrong consciousness] because of being a consciousness that apprehends its object, a form which is a phenomenon-source, as blue, whereas it does not exist as blue.

However, we say that for the person who is dreaming that [dream consciousness that clearly sees the blue of a dream as blue] is a factually concordant sense consciousness.

Examples of the second, wrong consciousnesses that are sense consciousnesses, are a sense consciousness which sees snow mountains as blue and a sense consciousness that sees a white conch as yellow.

### **3. Threefold division of awareneses and knowers**

With respect to the threefold division of awareneses and knowers there are three parts:

- (1) explanation of conceptual consciousnesses that take a meaning generality as their apprehended object,
- (2) explanation of non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses that take a specifically characterized phenomenon as their apprehended object, and

(3) explanation of non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses that take a clear appearance of a non-existent as their apprehended object.

### **(A) CONCEPTUAL CONSCIOUSNESSES THAT TAKE A MEANING GENERALITY AS THEIR APPREHENDED OBJECTS**

With respect to the first, [explanation of conceptual consciousnesses that take a meaning generality as their apprehended object] there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

#### ***Definition***

First, the definition of a **conceptual consciousness** is:

a determinative knower that apprehends a sound [generality] and a meaning [generality] as suitable to be mixed.

The [term] “sound” of “sound and meaning”, [refers] to a sound generality and the “meaning” [refers] to a meaning generality. That which apprehends those two as mixed apprehends a collection of those two.

There is a purpose for saying “suitable” [to be mixed] because it is necessary to include conceptual consciousnesses in the continuum of a person who has not trained in nomenclature.

This is because a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of such [a person] does not apprehend sound and meaning generalities as mixed, but merely as suitable to be mixed.

#### ***Divisions***

Second, when conceptual consciousnesses are divided, there are three:

- (1) conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend only a sound generality,
- (2) conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend only a meaning generality, and
- (3) conceptual consciousnesses that apprehend both a sound and a meaning generality.

An illustration of the first [a conceptual consciousness that apprehends only a sound generality] is a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of a person who does not know that a bulbous flat-based thing that is able to perform the function of holding water is a pot which, generated in dependence on merely on the sound “pot” apprehends pot.

An illustration of the second [a conceptual consciousness that apprehends only a meaning generality] is a conceptual consciousness in the continuum of such a person [who does not know that a bulbous flat-based thing able to perform the function of holding water is a pot] which, generated in dependence on merely seeing a bulbous thing apprehends a bulbous thing.

An illustration of the third [a conceptual consciousness that apprehends both a sound and a meaning generality] is a conceptual consciousness – in the continuum of a person who knows pot – apprehending a pot.

“What are the sound and meaning generalities of pot?”

That appearance which is an appearance as pot to the first conceptual consciousness [in the above three illustrations] is just a sound generality.

That appearance which is the appearance of a bulbous thing to the second conceptual consciousness [in the above illustrations] is just a meaning generality.

When either a pot or a bulbous thing appears to the third conceptual consciousness [in the above illustrations] there is the appearance of both a sound and a meaning generality.

When conceptual consciousness are divided [in another way], there are two:

- (1) conceptual consciousnesses that affix names, and
- (2) conceptual consciousnesses that affix meanings.

A conceptual consciousness that apprehends [its object within] thinking “This bulbous thing is a pot,” is both [a conceptual consciousness that affixes a name and one that affixes a meaning].

Respectively,

- [it is the first] because of being a determinative knower that apprehends [its object] within affixing the name “pot” to the object [the bulbous thing];
- [it is the second] because of being a determinative knower that apprehends [its object] within affixing attributes to a substratum.

Whatever is a conceptual consciousness that affixes a meaning is not necessarily one that affixes a name, for a conceptual consciousness that apprehends [its object within] thinking, “This person has a stick,” is a conceptual consciousness that affixes [only] a meaning.

It is a conceptual consciousness that apprehends [its object] within affixing an attribute - stick - to a substratum - person.

Also, whatever is a conceptual consciousness is not necessarily either of those two, for a conceptual consciousness that apprehends merely the substratum “pot” is neither of those two.

When conceptual consciousnesses are divided [in another way] there are two:

- (1) factually concordant conceptual consciousnesses and
- (2) factually discordant conceptual consciousnesses.

The definition of a **factually concordant conceptual consciousness** is:

a factually concordant determinative knower that apprehends a sound generality and a meaning generality as suitable to be mixed.

If something is an established base, the conceptual consciousness apprehending it is necessarily a factually concordant conceptual consciousness.

The definition of a **factually discordant conceptual consciousness** is:

a factually discordant determinative knower that apprehends a sound generality and a meaning generality as suitable to be mixed.

If something is not an established base, the conceptual consciousness apprehending it is necessarily a factually discordant conceptual consciousness.

**(B) NON-CONCEPTUAL NON MISTAKEN CONSCIOUSNESSES THAT TAKE A SPECIFICALLY CHARACTERIZED PHENOMENON AS THEIR APPREHENDED OBJECT**

With regard to the second [of the threefold division of awarenesses and knowers, non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses that take a specifically characterized phenomenon as their apprehended object], there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

***Definition***

The definition of something's being a **non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousness** is:

a knower having clear appearance that is non-mistaken with regard to its appearing object.

The two, [non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousness] and directly perceiving awareness are synonyms.

***Divisions***

When [non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses] are divided, there are four:

- (1) sense non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses,
- (2) mental non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses,
- (3) self-knowing non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses, and
- (4) yogic direct perceiving non-conceptual non-mistaken consciousnesses.

Since they were already explained above one should know this.

**(C) NON-CONCEPTUAL MISTAKEN CONSCIOUSNESSES THAT TAKE A CLEAR APPEARANCE OF A NON-EXISTENT AS THEIR APPREHENDED OBJECT.**

With regard to the third [of the threefold division of awarenesses and knowers, non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses that take a clear appearance of a non-existent as their apprehended object], there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

***Definition***

First, the definition of something's being a **non-conceptual mistaken consciousness** is:

a knower having clear appearance that is mistaken with regard to its appearing object.

***Divisions***

When [non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses] are divided, there are two:

- (1) sense consciousnesses that are [non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses] and
- (2) mental consciousnesses that are [non-conceptual mistaken consciousnesses].

The definition of the first [**a sense consciousness that is a non-conceptual mistaken consciousness**] is:  
that which is a common locus of

- being a non-conceptual mistaken consciousness and
- being produced in dependence upon a physical sense power that is its uncommon empowering condition.

The definition of the second [**a mental consciousness that is a non-conceptual mistaken consciousness**] is:

that which is a common locus of

- being a non-conceptual mistaken consciousness and
- being produced in dependence upon a mental sense power that is its uncommon empowering condition.

#### **4. Twofold division of awarenesses**

Furthermore, with regard to awarenesses, there are two:

- (1) self-knowers and
- (2) other-knowers.

The first of these [i.e., self-knower] and consciousness that is directed only inward are synonyms.

The second [i.e., other-knower] and consciousness that is turned outward are synonyms.

Sense, mental and yogic direct perceivers, as well as conceptual consciousnesses are illustrations of the second [i.e., other-knowers].

Whatever is any of those [a sense direct perceiver, mental direct perceiver, yogic direct perceiver, or conceptual consciousness] must be an other-knower.

#### **5. Another twofold division of awarenesses and knowers**

Furthermore, with respect to awarenesses and knowers there are two:

- (1) minds and
- (2) mental factors.

##### **(A) Minds**

The definition of a **main mind** is:

a main knower that is posited by way of apprehending the entity of its object.

Main mind (*gtso sems*), mind (*sems, chitta*), mentality (*vid, manas*), and consciousness (*rnam shes, vijñana*) are mutually inclusive and synonymous.<sup>2</sup>

When [minds are] divided by way of entity there are six:

(1-6) from eye consciousness up to mental consciousness.

If condensed, they are included into two:

- (1) sense consciousnesses and
- (2) mental consciousnesses.

There are four possibilities between the two, mentality (*vid, manas*) and mental consciousness (*vid shes, manovijñana*). This is because

- an eye consciousness is a possibility that is mentality but not a mental consciousness;
- the feeling accompanying a mental consciousness is a possibility that is a mental consciousness but is not mentality;
- a mental consciousness is a possibility that is both mentality and a mental consciousness; and the feeling accompanying an eye consciousness is a possibility that is neither mentality nor a mental consciousness.

One should know similarly the way of positing four possibilities between the two, mentality and sense consciousness (*dbang shes, indriyajñana*) and four possibilities between the two, exalted wisdom (*ye shes, jñana*) and mental consciousness (*vid shes, manojñana*).

## **(B) MENTAL FACTORS**

The definition of a **mental factor** is:

a knower that apprehends any of the features of its object and accompanies whatever main mind has similarity with it.

A mind and its accompanying mental factors possess the five aspects of mutual similarity because of having similarity of:

- (1) basis,
- (2) object of observation,
- (3) aspect,
- (4) time, and
- (5) substantial entity.

This is so:

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<sup>2</sup> Editor's note: Throughout this section on Mind the words "sentience" (*vid*) and "perceiver" (*rnam shes*) that occur in E. Napper's translation have been respectively changed to "mentality" and "consciousness."



- because the accompanying mental factor depends on the sense power, as its *basis*, on which the main mind depends;
- because the accompanying mental factor is produced from that *object of observation* in dependence on which the main mind is produced;
- because the *aspect* of any object appears to the accompanying mental factor just as it appears to the main mind;
- because the accompanying mental factor is also produced at the *same time* as the main mind is produced;
- because a main mind and its accompanying mental factor are produced qualified by [being] *one type of substantial entity* and are not produced as different substantial entities.

Vasubandhu's *Treasury of Knowledge (Abhidharmakosha)* says: "...synonymous. Mind and mental factors have five aspects of possessing similarity."

When mental factors are divided, there are fifty-one:

- (1) five omnipresent factors,
- (2) five determining factors,
- (3) eleven virtuous factors,
- (4) six root afflictions,
- (5) twenty secondary afflictions, and
- (6) four changeable factors.

### **(1) Five omnipresent factors**

The first five:

- (1) feeling,
- (2) discrimination,
- (3) intention,
- (4) mental engagement, and
- (5) contact

accompany all minds and thus are explained as "omnipresent." This is so because whenever any one among these five is not complete, enjoyment of the object is not complete:

- without feeling, the experiencing of pleasure, pain, and so forth, does not arise;
- without discrimination, designation of verbal conventions does not occur;
- without intention, engagement of the object does not occur;
- without mental engagement, directing the mind to the object of observation does not occur;
- without contact, feeling – pleasure, pain, and so forth – is not generated.

However, it is not definite that these [omnipresent mental factors] must exist manifestly, because at times such as the occasion of the subtle mind of death, or the time of just having made the connection [to one's next rebirth, i.e., having just entered the womb] or when absorbed in [an

equipoise of] cessation, some of these – feelings and so forth – merely engage [their object] in a dormant manner.

### ***(A) Feeling***

With respect to the first from among these, feeling, there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

#### ***Definition***

First, the definition of **feeling** is:

a knower that is distinguished by being that which experiences.

Feeling and feeling aggregate are synonymous.

#### ***Divisions***

Second, when [feelings] are divided, there are three:

- (1) two-fold division,
- (2) three-fold division, and
- (3) five-fold division.

With respect to the first, [the two-fold division of feeling], there are the two:

- (1) physical feeling and
- (2) mental feeling.

The first [i.e., physical feeling], feeling that is a sense consciousness, and external feeling are synonyms.

The second [i.e., mental feeling], feeling that is a mental consciousness, and internal feeling are synonyms.

Also, there is a two-fold [division of feeling] into:

- (1) materialistic feeling and
- (2) non-materialistic feeling.

The first [i.e. materialistic feeling] and contaminated feeling are synonyms.

The second [non-materialistic feeling] and non-contaminated feeling are synonyms.

The three-fold division [of feelings] is into the three:

- (1) happy feelings,
- (2) suffering feelings, and
- (3) equanimity feelings.

Moreover, although whatever is pleasure or pain is necessarily feeling, whatever is equanimity is not necessarily feeling. This is because, with regard to equanimity, there are three:

- (1) equanimity feeling [or neutral feeling],
- (2) equanimity of [that is to say, desisting from] application, which is included among the eleven virtuous [mental factors], and
- (3) immeasurable equanimity [or a sense of equality devoid of desire and hatred].

The five-fold division [of feeling] is into the five:

- (1) happiness feeling,
- (2) mental happiness feeling,
- (3) suffering feeling,
- (4) mental unhappiness feeling, and
- (5) equanimity feeling.<sup>3</sup>

Whatever is mental happiness is necessarily happiness but is necessarily not the happiness that is within the five-fold division of feeling. This is because whatever is happiness within the five-fold division of feeling must be a physical feeling of happiness.

Similarly, whatever is mental unhappiness is necessarily suffering, but is necessarily not the suffering that is within the five-fold division of feeling. This is because whatever is pain within the five-fold division of feeling must be a physical feeling of suffering.

### ***(B-E) Discrimination and so forth***

The latter [four omnipresent mental factors,] discrimination, and so forth, are to be known from the lower and upper *Knowledges* [that is, from Vasubhandu's *Treasury of Knowledge* and Asanga's *Compendium of Knowledge (Abhidharmasamucchaya)*].

### **(2) Five object determining mental factors**

The second [group of mental factors], the five:

- (1) aspiration,
- (2) belief,
- (3) mindfulness,
- (4) stabilization, and
- (5) wisdom,

individually ascertain objects and thus are called “ascertainers [or determiners] of objects.”

- Aspiration aspires to or seeks the object.
- Belief engages that object joyfully.
- Mindfulness apprehends the object of observation and the aspect.
- Stabilization abides one-pointedly.

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<sup>3</sup>Editor's note: Throughout this section on feelings the words “pleasure,” “displeasure,” and “pain” that occur in E. Napper's translation have been respectively changed to “happiness,” “unhappiness,” and “suffering.”

- Wisdom analyzes individually.

The first [i.e., that aspiration aspires to or seeks the object] is established because aspiration (*'dunpa*), wish (*'dod pa*), and seeking (*don gnyer*) are synonyms.

Thus, if there exists an aspiration that seeks a certain phenomenon, effort for the sake of that phenomenon is begun.

### **(3) Eleven virtuous mental factors**

The third [group of mental factors] – the eleven:

- (1) faith,
- (2) shame,
- (3) embarrassment,
- (4) non-desire,
- (5) the mental factor that is non-hatred,
- (6) the mental factor that is non-ignorance,
- (7) effort,
- (8) pliancy,
- (9) conscientiousness,
- (10) equanimity, and
- (11) non-harmfulness –

are virtues by way of turning away from their opposites, non-faith, and so forth. Thus, they are called the “eleven virtuous factors” and are a definite enumeration.

However, faith in that which is not an object of faith, such as demons, and so forth, and effort in the direction of non-virtue are imputed faith and effort, but not actual [faith and effort]. Since this is so, it is necessary to distinguish these.

### **(4) Six root afflictions**

The fourth [group of mental factors] – the six:

- (1) desire which is that, [i.e., a root affliction],
- (2) anger,
- (3) pride,
- (4) ignorance,
- (5) afflicted doubt, and
- (6) afflicted view, –

act as the root of both cyclic existence and the secondary afflictions, and thus are called “root afflictions.”

Whatever is either desire or ignorance is not necessarily a root affliction for these [occurring] in the continuum of a bodhisattva superior are not root afflictions because they are diminished in capacity, like poison overcome by medicine or mantra.

### **(5) Twenty secondary afflictions**

The fifth [group of mental factors] – the twenty:

- (1) belligerence,
- (2) resentment,
- (3) concealment,
- (4) spite,
- (5) jealousy,
- (6) miserliness,
- (7) deceit,
- (8) dissimulation,
- (9) haughtiness,
- (10) harmfulness,
- (11) non-shame,
- (12) non-embarrassment,
- (13) lethargy,
- (14) excitement,
- (15) non-faith,
- (16) laziness,
- (17) non-conscientiousness,
- (18) forgetfulness,
- (19) non-introspection, and
- (20) distraction –

arise from and are close to their causes, the root afflictions, and thus are called “secondary afflictions”.

### **(6) Four changeable mental factors**

The sixth [group of mental factors] – the four:

- (1) sleep,
- (2) contrition,
- (3) investigation, and
- (4) analysis –

can become [any of the] three, virtuous, non-virtuous, or neutral, and thus are called “changeable”. This is because such change can occur due to [there being] at the time of sleep, for instance, faith or non-faith in the Three Jewels, contrition or non-contrition for virtues and sins, and so forth.

## **6. Ancillarily, the mode of asserting tenets**

Ancillarily, with respect to the mode of asserting tenets, Vaibhashikas, Sautrantika SvatantrikaMadhyamikas, and Prasangikas assert that direct valid cognizers are limited to three:

- (1) sense direct perceivers,
- (2) mental direct perceivers, and
- (3) yogic direct perceivers.

This is because they do not assert self-knowing direct perceivers. Sautrantikas, Chittamatrins, and Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas assert direct valid cognizers to be limited to four:

- (1) sense direct perceivers,
- (2) mental direct perceivers,
- (3) self-knowing direct perceivers, and
- (4) yogic direct perceivers.

The Sautrantikas assert that whatever is a direct perceiver is necessarily a non-mistaken consciousness, but the Chittamatrins do not, for Chittamatrins assert that a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary person apprehending a form is a mistaken consciousness.

Apply this similarly to the latter four [sense direct perceivers] – sense direct perceivers apprehending sounds, and so forth. The Yogachara Svatantrika Madhyamikas have similar [assertions].

The Sautrantikas assert that whatever is a direct perceiver is necessarily a non-mistaken consciousness, for they assert that a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary person apprehending a form is a non-mistaken consciousness.

This is because they assert that a form is an external object in just the way that it appears to be one to a sense direct perceiver in the continuum of an ordinary person apprehending a form.

Sautrantikas and Chittamatrins, as well as Svatantrikas, assert that direct perceivers are necessarily free from conceptuality, but Prasangikas do not.

This is because there are many differences in [the Prasangikas'] mode of assertion: [They] assert “incontrovertible knower” to be the definition of “valid cognizer”; that subsequent cognizers are necessarily valid cognizers; that among direct valid cognizers there are both conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses; and so forth.

According to Kay-drup’s *Ocean of Reasoning, Explanation of (Dharmakirti’s) “Commentary on (Dignaga’s) ‘Compendium on Valid cognition’”*: “Here [in Prasangika] the definition of “valid cognizer” is “that which is incontrovertible”. Such is asserted in accordance with how it is posited in the world. In the world, without distinguishing *new* incontrovertibility, that which is incontrovertible in general is posited as a valid cognizer and thus it is clear that even subsequent cognizers that are induced by non-conceptual direct valid cognizers are asserted as valid cognizers. Because of this there are direct valid cognizers even among conceptual valid cognizers.”

The order of the four direct perceivers must be just as it is, for Gen-dun-drup’s *Ornament for Valid Reasoning: the General Meaning of (Dharmakirti’s) “Commentary on (Dignaga’s) ‘Compendium of Valid cognition’”* says, “In what way is the order of the four direct perceivers definite? [Answer]: Since yogic direct perceivers exist only in the continuums of Superiors, they are indicated last; since the other three [direct perceivers] exist in the continuums of both common beings and Superiors, they are indicated first. Moreover, within those [first three], the two other knowers are indicated

first because they are objects of experience; since self-knowers experience both of those, they are indicated last. Furthermore, between [the first two], sense direct perceivers are indicated first because they are causes [of mental direct perceivers] and mental direct perceivers are indicated last because they are effects.”

### III. EXPRESSIVE SOUNDS

With respect to the third, expressive sounds, there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

#### *Definition*

First, the definition of something's being an **expressive sound** is:

an object of hearing that causes the understanding of its own object of expression through the force of nomenclature.

#### *Divisions*

When these are divided by way of entity, there are three:

- (1) names,
- (2) phrases, and
- (3) letters.

#### **(1) Names**

With respect to the first, [names], there are two parts: (1) definition and (2) divisions.

#### *Definition*

First, the definition of something's being a **name** is:

an object of hearing that causes understanding of its own meaning.

#### *Divisions*

When these are divided, there are two:

- (1) actual names and
- (2) designated names.

The definition of the **actual name of a certain object** is:

that which is observed as the common locus of:

- being a term initially applied arbitrarily to that object and
- being the main name of that object.

The definition of the **designated name of a certain object** is:

that which is observed as a common locus of:

- being a term later applied to that object and
- being a secondary name of that object.

An illustration of an actual name is speech calling the king of beasts “lion.”

When designated names are divided, there are two:

- (1) names designated by reason of similarity and
- (2) names designated by reason of relationship.

An illustration of the first [a name designated by reason of similarity] is speech calling a brahmin’s son who has a big mouth and pug nose a lion; this is because Dharmakirti’s *Commentary on(Dignaga’s) “Compendium on Valid cognition”* says, “Calling the son of a brahman ‘lion’ in this way exists also in the world.”

With respect to the second, [names designated by reason of relationship], there are two:

- (1) names designated by reason of a causal relationship and
- (2) names designated by reason of a relationship of nature.

With respect to the first, [a name designated by reason of a causal relationship,] there are two:

- (1) designated names in which the name of the cause is designated to the effect and
- (2) designated names in which the name of the effect is designated to the cause.

An illustration of the first [a designated name in which the name of the cause is designated to the effect] is speech calling sunlight sun.

An illustration of the second [a designated name in which the name of the effect is designated to the cause] is speech calling a correct proof statement an inferential cognizer.

An illustration of the second, a name designated by reason of a relationship of nature is speech calling the burned fringe of a piece of cloth burned cloth.

## **(2) Phrases**

With respect to the second [of the threefold division of expressive sounds], the definition of a **phrase** is:

an object of hearing that indicates [meaning] by joining substratum and attribute.

An illustration [of a phrase] is “Alas, products are impermanent, subject to production and disintegration.”

## **(3) Letters**

With respect to the third [of the threefold division of expressive sounds] the definition of a **letter** is:

a vocalization that is a basis of forming the two, names and phrases.



Illustrations [of letters] are the thirty letters, ka, and so forth.

When expressive sounds are terminologically divided, there are two:

- (1) sounds that express types and
- (2) sounds that express collections.

With respect to the difference between sounds that express types and sounds that express collections, there are four possibilities:

- (1) something that is a sound expressing a type but not a sound expressing collection,
- (2) something that is a sound expressing a collection but not a sound expressing a type,
- (3) something that is both of those, and
- (4) something that is neither of those.

The *first possibility* exists because the sound that expresses “object of knowledge” is a sound expressing a type but is not a sound expressing a collection.

The first reason [i.e., that the sound expressing “object of knowledge” is a sound expressing a type] has already been established.

The *second possibility* [a sound expressing a collection but not a sound expressing a type] exists because the sound expressing “the two, pillar and pot” is a sound that expresses a collection but not a sound that expresses a type.

The *third possibility* [both a sound that expresses a collection and a sound that expresses a type] exists because the sound expressing pot is both of those.

The *fourth possibility* [something that is neither a sound that expresses a collection nor a sound that expresses a type] exists because the sound that expresses “the two, permanent phenomenon and thing” is neither of those two.

Based on these few words explaining  
Awareness and knowledge, illuminating  
Limitless topics of knowers and objects known,  
May the vast paths of reasoning increase.

*Sarvamangalam*